Introduction
American Progressivism, a political and intellectual movement that lasted roughly from the mid-1890s until 1920, began bringing the century old era of American scientific racism to an end. Its critics have been vocal, however. Progressives have been charged with promotion of eugenics, and thus with mainstreaming practices such as school and housing segregation, compulsory sterilization of those deemed unfit, and exclusion of immigrants on racial grounds. 1 
Practice.
15 He was using the term "progressive" not to describe a wide ranging political movement, however, but rather a theory of taxation based on marginalist economics, which was only one important principle of progressivism. 16 That same year Herbert Croly, founder of The New Republic, published his highly influential The Promise of American Life, 17 which used the word "progressive" to advocate government economic planning as part of a transition to a more corporate rather than individualistic conception of capitalism. The political label "progressive" became popular prior during the 1912 Presidential election campaign, where it was claimed to some extent by all three Presidential candidates, Theodore Roosevelt, William H. Taft, and Woodrow Wilson. 18 Identifying the origins of a comprehensive progressive rhetoric is difficult. 19 The reification of the term had to await such mid-century historians as Richard Hofstadter, whose The Age of Reform (1955) attempted to characterize it and classify its members. Hofstadter missed some of Progressivism's most important characteristics, however. For example, he completely ignored the development of marginalism in economics, which was central to Progressive economic policy, although he did say a great deal about the classical, or laissez faire, economics against which Progressives were reacting. 20 Failure to engage Progressivism's economics has been a shortcoming in the intellectual history of the Progressive Era ever since. For example, Thomas Leonard's very good book Illiberal Reformers is expressly about American economists during the Progressive Era. Nevertheless, his entire discussion of marginalism is limited to two pages about the marginal productivity theory of wages. 21 Marginalism did substitute a new theory of wages, but it did much more than that -including new theories about institutions, wealth distribution, government regulation, competition policy, tax policy, and risk management, as well as a set of methodologies that gradually came to set economics apart from the other social sciences. 22 The best way to understand Progressivism's reaction to Gilded Age individualism is to understand its economics. 23 Those who self-identified with Progressivism were diverse. At risk of oversimplification, the movement's most important intellectual characteristics were (1) marginalism in economics, with its increased emphasis on forward looking expected value and risk management, wealth distribution, and market failure; (2) a strong tendency to follow prevailing science, including a fascination for emergent social science; (3) a concern with broader political participation in all levels of government as well as business; and 4) a commitment to "institutionalism," or the view that resources should and do move through society by diverse mechanisms, of which the traditional market is only one. These views were shared by many Americans, but certainly not by all.
Just as any other movement, the Progressives inherited some theories and developed new ones. Among the former were well established scientific theories about the human race, many of which antedated the Civil War. As Progressive social science matured, however, it developed its own models that were much more environmentalist and dismissive, not only of hereditary determinism, but even of the very concept of race. The result was the views that we most strongly identify today with the Progressive social science revolution -namely, cultural relativism, behaviorism, instrumentalism, and other environmentally based theories of human behavior. 24 For hereditary determinists, inheritance played a nearly exclusive role in determining an organism's most important characteristics. Further, one's inheritance from the past could not be changed. The role of the environment was thought to be small to non-existent. People of all political stripes shared these views, and much of the legislation characterized as representing Progressive beliefs about inheritance and race was not passed by Progressives at all. Indeed much of the current criticism of Progressives for their racism begins by identifying as "Progressive' anyone who lived during that area. 25 Was Progressive racism different from the racism of non-progressive contemporaries? And more importantly, who led the emergence from the heavily hereditary race theories of the nineteenth century to the relatively more egalitarian theories of the 1910s and after? Related to this last question is another: how can we explain the political "flip" that occurred on questions of race, origins, and immigration? Increasingly since the 1940s racial minorities have aligned themselves with liberal or progressive political leaders.
This article explores American engagement with these issues in public law, economics, and social science. To the extent possible, it uses "Progressive" with a capital P to refer specifically to the short-lived movement that was a strong force in American politics prior to the election of Warren Harding in 1920. By contrast, progressivism with a small "p" refers to a collection of ideologies and policy positions that have reappeared time and again in American politics, including the 2016 political campaigns of Bernie Sanders and Hillary Clinton. 26 Many of these later self-proclaimed progressives were Democrats, but not all. For example, Dwight D. Eisenhower ran on a platform emphasizing "progressive moderation." 27 Nelson Rockefeller's wing of the Republican Party was referred to as "progressive Republicans," and included such people as Chief Justice Earl Warren. 28 The original Progressive movement also cut across party 24 For a chronicle of the decline, written by a contemporary, see J. B. Eggen, The Fallacy of Eugenics, 5 SOCIAL FORCES 104 (1926) . 25 See discussion infra, text at notes [40] [41] [42] . 26 On the recurrence of self-acknowledged progressivism in American politics, see Hovenkamp My argument here is, first, prior to and during the early Progressive Era hereditary racism was the scientific model of the day, cutting across a wide range of disciplines and reaching people of all political persuasions, even into the most elite of American research institutions. 29 The people we identify as the original Progressives were all educated during this period. By and large, non-Progressives were just as racist as Progressives and some significantly more so. Further, the Progressive period lay entirely within the southern era of Jim Crow legislated segregation, 30 often making it impossible to identify particular racial attitudes in the New South as "Progressive," rather than simply as inherited features of southern racial views held from long before the Civil War. This is particularly true for southerners such as Woodrow Wilson. It thus becomes critical to distinguish the views that the first generation of Progressives inherited from those that they developed themselves.
Second, if Progressive public policy on race differed from prevailing alternatives, it was that Progressives believed in a more active State. They were more supportive of legislative intervention than their more laissez faire predecessors and opponents. Racism supported by a legislative agenda can be much more aggressive and uglier than racism that is passively tolerated. One cannot characterize most of the segregationist, exclusionary, and other racist legislation passed during this era as "Progressive," however. Southern states actively promoted racial exclusion by an assortment of statutes that today go under the name "Jim Crow." All of the racial zoning laws sometimes attributed to Progressives were passed in formerly slaveholding states. 31 Whatever the ideological or scientific sources of these laws, they were supported by staunch anti-Progressives. The same thing is true of compulsory sterilization laws. For example, the Supreme Court Justices who voted consistently against Progressive labor protection and other regulatory legislation also largely voted to uphold compulsory sterilization of mental "defectives."
32 While many Progressives advocated for more restrictive immigration laws, nothing passed during the Progressive Era matched the explicit restrictions on Chinese immigration that came earlier, or the racist immigration restrictions promoted by anti-Third, one distinctive feature of progressivism was its leadership in rejecting hereditary racism in favor of more environmentalist, nurture-based models of human nature and development. These views began to take hold in the social sciences already in the 1910s and 1920s and began to change legal thinking in the 1940s. 34 They found expression in a Supreme Court that was almost unanimously self-acknowledged progressive. The result was gradual emergence of a division that has endured to this day, with progressives largely appearing as the champions of racial inclusion, diversity, and procedural due process.
The Progressive Era and the Science of Race
Racism was deeply engrained in nineteenth century American social and scientific thought. 35 The genetic Darwinism that dominated racial theory after the Civil War initially served to reify and extend these views into the newly fashioned social sciences. These ideas were held by people of all political ideologies, although not unanimously. One set of dissenters from evolutionary racism were Christian evangelicals who rejected the theory of evolution, but were equally racist for other reasons. 36 Another was a dwindling number of scientists who also denied evolution and favored alternatives such as polygenesis, which was even more racist than the theories embraced by the scientific mainstream.
37
Many of these attitudes did not differ noticeably from the views of elite western thinkers who wrote long before the Progressive Era. Charles Darwin himself believed that Caucasians had come out the winners in the human struggle for existence that he had described in The Descent of Man. 38 In fact, many interpreted the theory of evolution to give credence to a secular, "scientific" view of racial superiority that lasted well into the twentieth century.
39
The beginning of the Progressive Era coincided with a broad-based revolution in the social science of race. One characteristic of progressive policy ever since its inception was its tendency to follow prevailing science, changing its political views when dominant scientific views changed. This fact has served to make the progressive state somewhat less stable than more ideologically driven alternatives, but it has also enabled them to step away from 33 See discussion infra, notes 270-272. 34 See discussion infra, notes 328-338. 35 unappealing past commitments. 40 The hereditary determinism that prevailed prior to and during the early Progressive Era tended to find strong hereditary explanations for criminal and other antisocial behavior, including sexual promiscuity and even differences in basic intelligence. 41 Some writers describe these racial theories as "progressive" simply because someone asserted them during the Progressive Era. Some take this to uninformed extremes --even characterizing strong anti-Progressives such as Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr. 42 or Justice James McReynolds, 43 one of the Four Horsemen who voted to strike down so much Progressive legislation, as "progressive" simply because they lived during that era.
As is true of so many legal movements that incorporate science, however, the legal policy often lagged behind the science. One prominent example of this was the absorption of classical economic ideas into American statecraft. Americans first began to embrace laissez faire economic ideas with the election of President Jackson in 1828, roughly a half century after Adam Smith articulated them in The Wealth of Nations. 44 The Constitutionalization of laissez faire economic policy largely occurred in the 1880s and after in the state courts, 45 however, and not until the turn of the century in the federal courts. 46 By that time the marginalist revolution in mainstream Anglo-American economics was well underway, with its rejection of the wage-fund doctrine, as well as increased concern about market failure and the need for regulatory intervention. 47 Holmes was well aware of this already in his 1905 Lochner dissent, complaining that the majority was deciding the case based "upon an economic theory which a large part of the country does not entertain." 48 In sum, American constitutional statecraft embraced laissez faire economic theory just as it was becoming obsolete within mainstream economics. The same thing happened in the case of genetic determinism and eugenics.
Racial Science Before Genetics
Long before Darwin, racism was a central feature of European and American theories about humanity. 50 It was hardly invented during the Progressive Era and came from a variety of sources, including both science and religion. Around 1733 Voltaire opined in an essay that black Africans were so interior to white that they were "not capable of any great application or association of ideas…. They are a race peculiar to that part of Africa, the same as elephants and monkeys."
51 Twenty years later David Hume argued that "there never was a civilized nation of any other complexion than white…. No ingenious manufactures among them, no arts, no sciences." 52 In his Notes on the State of Virginia (1781) Thomas Jefferson compared AfroAmericans to primates, most notably the Orangutan.
53
The post-Civil War era gave birth to a revolution in evolutionary social science theory that became institutionalized in American universities. 54 Following after Darwin himself, many of the early social scientists were scientific racists as well. Some were racist in more old fashioned ways, based more on historical practice, their reading of Christian Scripture, or the use of racial science and pseudoscience in the South to justify slavery first and statutorily enforced segregation later. 55 Darwin's theory of evolution invited theorizing about human "stages" of evolution and served to rationalize white racial supremacy. Darwin himself predicted a future "at no very distant date, when an endless number of the lower races will have been eliminated by the higher civilized races throughout the world." 56 Thomas Huxley, Darwin's indefatigable defender and popularizer, wrote in the 1860s:
No rational man, cognizant of the facts, believes that the average negro is the equal, still less the superior, of the white man. And if this be true, it is simply incredible that, when all his disabilities are removed, and our prognathous relative has a fair field and no 50 On pre-Darwinian racial theory in the United States, see WILLIAM STANTON, THE LEOPARD'S SPOTS: SCIENTIFIC ATTITUDES TOWARD RACE IN AMERICA, 1815 AMERICA, -1859 AMERICA, at 50 (1960 favour, as well as no oppressor, he will be able to compete successfully with his biggerbrained and smaller-jawed rival, in a contest which is to be carried out by thoughts and not by bites.
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For many, Darwinian evolution supported a linear, "scientific" view of racial superiority that lasted well into the twentieth century, including the period encompassed by the Progressive Era.
58 During this period elite anti-evolutionists were just as racist, however. For example, the prominent Harvard University anti-evolutionary paleontologist Louis Agassiz was a believer in polygenesis, or the theory that the different races had distinct origins and were not even of the same species. Around 1850 Agassiz gave a lecture tour with a set of photographs of American slaves designed to illustrate their structural inferiority. 59 Belief in polygenesis was not uncommon among scientifically trained Americans prior to the Civil War and died out only slowly thereafter. In fact, polygenesis offered one of the strongest rationales for maintaining slavery and opposing interracial marriage -the idea that the Afro-American was a distinct and inferior class of beings. 60 Agassiz himself became one of the principal scientific opponents of Darwin in the United States, but his views were at least as racist as those of the Darwinians. 61 One historian identifies his influence at Harvard in the 1850s and 1860s with the origins of American scientific racism. 62 The leading evolutionary anthropologists prior to the Progressive Era were Oxford University Professor Edward Tylor 63 and Lewis Henry Morgan in the United States. 64 Both patterned their work after Darwin, whose On the Origin of Species 65 had been published in 1859, and The Descent of Man in 1871.
66 Both Tylor and Morgan followed Darwin in presenting the human race as evolving through a series of stages, culminating in white Caucasians. For Morgan, the theory of evolution showed that the black man was inferior to the white, and second only to Australian aborigines on a scale of racial inferiority. 67 Morgan granted to "Aryan and Semitic nations" the status of superior, "because they have carried [human progress] to the highest point yet attained."
68 Both of their books were published in the 1870s, more than a generation prior to the rise of Progressivism.
Genetics, Mathematics, and Eugenics
Darwin, Tylor, and Morgan all wrote before the emergence of genetics as a distinct scientific field. Nevertheless, Darwin's work inspired a great deal of scientific study about the link between race and inheritance. In 1877 Richard L. Dugdale, a member of the New York Prison Association, found a high correlation between inheritance and criminality in his book entitled The Jukes: A Study in Crime, Pauperism, Disease, and Heredity. 69 Dugdale identified more than 700 people in the extended Jukes family that had been criminals, suffered from mental disease, or required public assistance for their support. 70 Today it is widely believed that Dugdale fabricated much of his story --that many of the people he identified as "Jukes" were not related by blood at all, and that much of what he said about them was fiction.
71
Economists and mathematicians were drawn to eugenics and genetic theories of race superiority, much more than social scientists were. 72 That fact may seem counterintuitive, because disciplines such as anthropology and sociology engaged questions about race much more directly. The fact remains, however, that eugenics was most heavily promoted in the United States by heavily mathematical disciplines, while leaders in anthropology and other social sciences led the reaction against eugenics that paved the way for the more environmentalist, nurture based social science of the 1910s and after. 73 Indeed, the fact that eugenics was dominated by mathematicians explained both its extreme positions and its eventual downfall. Eugenicists were very interested in the mathematics of inheritance, but they devoted very little attention to the more empirical problem of determining which of an individual's characteristics are inherited and which are a product of environmental influences.
The rise of mathematical genetic science appeared not only to confirm the importance of heredity, but also to emphasize that environment and culture had little to do with intelligence, character, or ability. In his experiments with successive generations of peas, the Moravian cleric Gregor Mendel had already discovered what were widely perceived to be mathematical laws of inheritance. Mendel performed most of his experiments between 1856 and 1863, before 68 Id. at 507. 69 1877-1919 (1988) . 72 See discussion infra, text at notes 75-80. 73 See discussion infra, text at notes 281-310.
Darwin's work was well known. Mendel's studies lay dormant for four decades, however, until they were uncovered at the turn of the century. 74 Around 1889 English statistician Francis Galton, first cousin to Charles Darwin, tried to determine precise mathematical expressions that would predict a child's characteristics based on information about the characteristics of his or her parents. 75 Galton concluded that inherited characteristics were extremely stable and predicted mental ability, physical features, and also behavioral features. 76 For example, Galton's mathematical "law of natural inheritance" prescribed that the "offspring of any parentage, when considered in its entirety, inherits one half of its characteristics from its parents, one fourth from its grandparents, one-eighth from its greatgrandparents and so on." 77 Galton's law of "regression from mediocrity" was that offspring's inherited characteristics tended to moderate the more extreme characteristics of their ancestors. For example, Mendel's studies of peas showed that the optimal size of seed for reproduction was 3.94mm, which produced the highest survival rate. As peas went through successive generations, the range of diameters grew smaller and moved toward this optimal size. 78 In 1897 Galton presented a highly mathematical paper to the British Royal Society on the inheritance of coat color among Basset Hounds. 79 He derived a formula for making precise predictions about a Basset pup's various color combinations based on data about the coats of its ancestors. Galton's work in this area, together with that of his mentor, the statistician Karl Pearson, was instrumental in developing modern regression analysis. 80 Pearson would later write that:
It was Galton who first freed me from the prejudice that sound mathematics could only be applied to natural phenomena under the category of causation. Here for the first time was a possibility, I will not say a certainty, or reaching knowledge -as valid as physical knowledge was then thought to be -in the field of living forms and above all in the field of human conduct.
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The eugenics and Progressive movements were contemporary, and many of those who supported eugenics believed that legislation could be used to restrain biological deterioration. The perceived threats were the fertility of mental defectives and interracial sexual relations. Nevertheless, many other Progressives rejected eugenics, and many followers of eugenics were 74 82 Even anti-Progressives who opposed many other forms of control legislation, including protective labor legislation, nevertheless approved highly invasive legislation that sterilized those thought to be mentally unfit.
Building on the mathematical models of inheritance developed by Mendel and Galton, the science of eugenics reflected extreme emphasis on the genetic content of human character, to the point of disregarding environmental influences. At the time eugenics was not pseudoscience, however. A pseudoscience, such as astrology, must be rejected by the contemporary scientific mainstream. But that was hardly the case with eugenics, which took hold in elite American institutions and was taught in nearly 400 colleges and universities. 83 Eugenics derived its scientific status from its impressive use of mathematics. 85 The same was true of Progressive era economics, where marginalism invited mathematics into the discipline and greatly increased to its attractiveness to younger scholars. 86 Other fields, such as anthropology, which was not mathematical and much more involved with empirical questions about inheritance, were more reticent. Economists lost their infatuation with eugenics in the late 1910s and after, as marginalism became more technical and focused strictly on preferences, rejecting the idea that the biological quality of preferences is a legitimate subject of economics. In the process, economics largely cut its ties with the theory of evolution, including eugenics.
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During the Progressive Era many students of inheritance believed that Mendel and Galton provided the basis for a quantifiable theory of inheritance. Mainstream scientific journals from England and America were filled with their work. 88 Most of it was purely theoretical or 82 90 The article concluded that such congresses were "another witness of the growth of that best type of internationalism that leads scientific men to step unhesitatingly across political imaginary lines whenever they feel that they can work more effectively together than apart."
Darwin's own son Leonard Darwin became an enthusiastic advocate of eugenic human engineering. In 1912 he lectured to the Cambridge University Eugenics Society that the "primary object of Eugenics is, no doubt, to substitute for the slow and cruel methods of nature some more rational, humane, and rapid system of selection by which to ensure the continued progress of the race."
91 Although he did not cite his father's book, Variation of Animals and Plants under Domestication, 92 he must have had it in mind. Charles Darwin himself had concluded that evolution proceeds much more quickly under domestication and selective breeding, and that it can be directed through artificial as opposed to natural selection.
Most of the history writing about the eugenics movement, and particularly the legal history, has focused on the implications for human inheritance and the unappealing policy consequences. That picture mischaracterizes the movement as a whole, although it was the focus of some very popular texts, such as Popenoe & Johnson's Applied Eugenics. 93 Eugenics actually cut much more broadly, dominating theories about plant and livestock breeding as well. For example, William Castle, a geneticist who did much of his research on fruit flies, wrote an important textbook on the use of eugenics in animal and plant breeding. 94 Harvard Professor Edward Murray East's influential 1919 book Inbreeding and Outbreeding was concerned with the science of eugenics as applied to all plant and animal species.
95 His co-author, David F. Jones was a geneticist at the Connecticut Agricultural Experiment Station and a pioneer inventor of hybrid corn seed. 96 East and Jones were scientists, however, not policy makers. One disturbing feature of their book is the ease or even indifference with which the authors moved from discussions of selective breeding in plants or horses to engineering of human beings.
This point about the breadth of eugenics is also important when particular Progressive Era individuals are described as followers of eugenics. Some followers did believe in theories about human racial selection and sterilization, but others followed eugenics for no other reason than they had an interest in breeding plants or livestock, or else in its underlying mathematics. Approximately one third of the articles in the early issues of Biometrika, Galton's mathematical eugenics journal, were concerned with human beings and inheritance. Most of the others were about mice, fruit flies, or other organisms, including plants. 97 Further, most of those that were about human beings were not about racial superiority but about such technical matters as the relationship between inheritance and skull shape, or the correlation between human hair color and eye color.
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Two elements of eugenics' mathematical approach to the laws of inheritance are critical for understanding early twentieth century scientific racism as well as the commonly accepted views about mental deficiency. They also help explain why eugenics failed. First, Galton's mathematical models functioned only if an individual's character was solely a product of the genes of parents and other ancestors. That is, admitting any environmental influences at all undermined mathematical predictability. This fact serves to explain why the first generation of Galton's followers were so steadfastly genetic in their ideas about race and capacity, completely ruling out or ignoring environmental influences. It also made alternative models that mixed environmental and genetic influences, such as those of Franz Boas and his followers, much more complex and unwieldy. 99 The other important result, however, was that when social science began to appreciate environmental factors more, the eugenicists' confidence in their ability to reengineer the human race began to look very naïve.
Second, the mathematical models that Galton and his followers developed also serve to explain why genetic determinism was so popular in the scientific community. Any science able to embrace mathematics was thought to be superior to less quantifiable alternatives. That same fact accounted for economists' claims of methodological superiority. Beginning in the 1920s, however, economics retained its mathematics but largely began to assume that every individual's utility preferences must be taken at face value. Searching out the biological or other sources of these preferences lay outside the boundaries of scientific economics. 100 In the process economists largely lost their infatuation with eugenics. 96 In 1901 Galton and his associates founded Biometrika, a journal historically dedicated to the mathematical determination of inheritance in all forms of biological organisms. 101 These views were adopted largely wholesale and extended by American geneticists such as Edward M. East, 102 zoologist Charles Davenport 103 and William Ernest Castle, 104 all members of Harvard's scientific faculty. Among the views were strong recommendations against interracial sex and marriage. Because so many relationships are formed when people are students, they also counselled against integrated education. The general thrust of this literature was not only that genetics accounts for all of the important features of human development, but also that environment counts for almost nothing. 105 The ideas were quickly popularized and found their way into legal argument. For example, in 1905 William Benjamin Smith, a German immigrant professor of mathematics at Tulane University, published a best seller entitled The Color Line, which applied eugenics to the problem of race. 106 Smith argued that eugenics completely undermined any notion of equality between the white and black races, and that "it was idle to talk of education and civilization ... as corrective or compensative agencies." The science of genetics had shown that these institutions are "weak and beggarly as over against the almightiness of heredity; the omnipotence of the transmitted germ plasma." 107 Smith's book is a classic in eugenics and race theory and has been kept in print. 108 More significantly for legal history, the passage above from The Color Line was quoted verbatim in Kentucky's brief successfully defending the segregation statute challenged in the Berea College Case. 109 The brief is interesting because Kentucky Attorney General James Breathitt submitted it only five months after Louis Brandeis had submitted his famous Brandeis Brief in Muller v. Oregon. 110 Breathitt also cited Sanford B. Hunt, a Civil War surgeon who had conducted numerous autopsies on deceased soldiers and concluded that the brains of black soldiers were, on average, five ounces lighter than those of white soldiers. Hunt accepted the view, already under sharp attack by 1908, that brain weight was proportional to intelligence. 111 As the Attorney General's brief emphasized:
If we are right in our contention that intimate association in the school room will ultimately led to social equality and amalgamation, who, then will estimate the import of this "mental gap" between the white and the black." 112 It is easy to discount these views as "pseudoscience," and some have. 113 But the fact is that they were widely held prior to the 1920s, by people of every political stripe, and even by academics at elite universities.
By the time of Berea College the lawfulness of racial segregation in public elementary schools was well established. A provision in the proposed 1875 Civil Rights Act had forbidden the exclusion of black students from schools, but it was removed prior to passage. 114 Even that proposal would merely have prohibited exclusion, or complete denial of educational facilities to black students. It would not have mandated integration. The 1875 Civil Rights Act, but without the school provision, remained in force until the Supreme Court struck it down in 1883 for exceeding Congressional power to legislate under §5 of the 14th Amendment. 115 Judicial decisions in 1871 116 and 1882 117 upheld segregated schools in Ohio and Kentucky, provided that they were equal. 118 A number of courts also agreed that nothing in state or federal constitutions prohibited segregated schools or, in some cases, the provision of no schools at all for black children.
119 All of this long antedated the Progressive Era.
Who Supported Eugenics?
During During its heyday eugenics had as much traction among conservatives as progressive liberals. 125 In the main, conservatives believed that some people were simply destined to be a social burden, and that forced sterilization or sexual isolation was a way of reducing this cost. Their support for eugenics legislation seems inconsistent with their general embrace of laissez faire policy. Conservatives were far more suspicious of legislation than Progressives were, particularly of legislation that limited due process rights. The breadth of conservative support for statutes that sterilized people who had never been convicted of a crime, 126 or that segregated entire classes of people, is thus remarkable.
The historical writing on eugenics sees the movement as evolving from "mainline" to "reform." "Mainline" eugenicists believed that heredity accounted for all elements of character, while later "reform" eugenicists acknowledged the importance of environmental sources."
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This development tracks changes in other social sciences, particularly anthropology and psychology, which rejected hereditary determinism early on. 128 Mainline eugenicists were fairly orthodox followers of Galton, who advocated social policies concerning procreation based exclusively on genetic determinism. These included sterilization of those believed to be mentally unfit, opposition to interracial marriage, as well as to birth control for fear that it would be most practiced by racially superior families, tilting population growth in favor of inferior HUMAN HEREDITY 85-100 (1985) . 128 See discussion infra, text at notes 277-300. races. 129 Many eugenicists were also opposed to higher education for women, largely for fear that it would induce upper class women to have fewer children.
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The multi-ideological nature of Americans' support for eugenics made it fundamentally a very different thing from Progressive legislative reform in areas of employment and industry regulation. A case in point is Buck v. Bell. 131 The Court ruled 8-1 to uphold a Virginia statute requiring Carrie Buck to be sterilized once it was determined that she was "feeble minded," and that both her mother and her illegitimate child were feeble minded. The attack was substantive and not procedural, 132 and was based on the Fourteenth Amendment's due process and equal protection clauses. 133 Justice Holmes's opinion produced one of the most reviled statements in the Supreme Court lexicon: "three generations of imbeciles are enough."
134 Nevertheless, of the nine votes cast in the decision Justice Holmes's is probably the least surprising. He was not sympathetic with most legislative reform, but he was also a strict textualist who had frequently objected when the Supreme Court overturned legislation without an explicit warrant in the text of the Constitution. 135 Applying the same reasoning, he found no infirmity in the sterilization law. Nevertheless, his opinion went further, making clear that he supported the statutorily mandated sterilization of people whose offspring were thought likely to be a burden on society. He compared Carrie Buck's sacrifice with that of soldiers who had fallen in combat:
We have seen more than once that the public welfare may call upon the best citizens for their lives. It would be strange if it could not call upon those who already sap the strength of the State for these lesser sacrifices, often not felt to be such by those concerned, in order to prevent our being swamped with incompetence. It is better for all the world, if instead of waiting to execute degenerate offspring for crime, or to let them starve for their 129 imbecility, society can prevent those who are manifestly unfit from continuing their kind.
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Among the votes cast in Buck, the more interesting were those of the anti-Progressive Four Horsemen --Pierce Butler, James McReynolds, George Sutherland and Willis Van Devanter. These four Justices were so named because they so often voted to strike down Progressive regulatory legislation, including minimum wage laws and many business regulations. 137 Only four years earlier Justice McReynolds had authored the Supreme Court's decision in Meyer v. Nebraska, which struck down a World War One era state statue aimed largely at Germans that severely restricted the teaching of foreign languages in elementary schools. He wrote eloquently about the need to extend substantive Due Process liberties beyond the economic and regulatory sphere, and provided this litany of the types of freedoms that should be protected:
. . . not merely freedom from bodily restraint but also the right of the individual to contract, to engage in any of the common occupations of life, to acquire useful knowledge, to marry, establish a home and bring up children, to worship God according to the dictates of his own conscience, and generally to enjoy those privileges long recognized at common law as essential to the orderly pursuit of happiness by free men.
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In Buck, however, three of the four Horsemen, including Justice McReynolds, voted to approve the sterilization order. The Fourth, Justice Pierce Butler dissented, but that was very likely because he was a Catholic. Catholics on principle objected to surgical sterilization for largely the same reasons that they subsequently became opposed to abortion.
139 Progressive Louis Brandeis, who voted consistently to uphold Progressive legislation, also voted in favor, as did Chief Justice Taft, who by this time had become quite conservative. In sum, no case can be made that Buck v. Bell reflects a Progressive/Anti-Progressive divide insofar as the Supreme Court was concerned.
Eugenics dominated mainstream scientific discourse during the period 1900-1920 or so. By the early 1920s, however, it was being pushed aside by scientific views emphasizing nurture more and environmental rather than hereditary determinants of human nature, in particular cultural relativism and behaviorism.
140 Increasingly, scholarly papers began to emphasize environmental factors in development. The work began with study of plants and agricultural products such as corn, but soon expanded to animal and then human inheritance. 141 By 1927, the date of Buck v. Bell, its legislation was already the target of considerable scientific doubt. Even prior to Buck, University of Michigan law school professor Burke Shartel complained of these cases that the "proof that some form of social inferiority will be passed on to offspring by these persons is far from conclusive."
143 Assuming Carrie Buck's feeble mindedness existed at all, 144 how much was a product of genetics, and how much emanated from the environment in which she, her mother, and her child were raised? The emerging view among contemporary scientists was that answering this question was much more difficult than the Buck decision made it out to be.
Ironically, part of Buck's downfall was the unintended consequences of state eugenics legislation that attempted to comply with due process by requiring evidence of the very thing that the eugenics movement generally assumed without proof -namely that the defects in question were actually hereditary. For example, two years after Buck the Utah Supreme Court concluded that the standards in Utah's compulsory sterilization law had not been met. The statute permitted compulsory sterilization upon proof that "the inmate, by the law of heredity, is the probable potential parent of socially inadequate offspring." After examining the record the court concluded:
As a general rule, members of judicial tribunals are not well informed as to the law of heredity. Even though they may be so informed, they may not take judicial notice that, if Esau Walton should have offspring, the same will be socially inadequate offspring likewise afflicted. Those who have made a thorough scientific study of the law of heredity are not in entire accord as to the operation of the so-called law, but doubtless persons so trained may lend valuable aid to judicial tribunals in determining the probable nature of the offspring of a given person. We doubt, however, that even the most ardent advocate of the immutability of the law of heredity would wish to determine the probable nature of the offspring of Esau Walton without more facts than appear in the record before us. Be that as it may, the record before us does not support the finding that "by the law of heredity Esau Walton is the probable potential parent of socially inadequate offspring likewise afflicted."
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In 1933 professor Jacob Henry Landman agreed in his analysis of Brewer v. Valk. The North Carolina Supreme Court had struck down that state's compulsory sterilization statute on procedural grounds because it provided for neither notice nor a hearing. Further, the court observed, the causes of "low mentality" can be numerous, including "the sins of the fathers, EVOLUTION 166-86 (rev. ed. 1988 ). Speaking of scientific developments that occurred in the late 1910s, Cravens wrote that the implications "...were momentous for genetics, evolution, the nature-nurture issue, and eugenics. The complexities... made inheritance far more contingent and complex than implied by the genetics 'principles' the eugenicists fondly recited." Id. heredity, disease, poverty, undernourishment -the struggle for daily bread, dissipation, and many other things…."
146 Mary Brewer was one of twelve children, one of whom had died of meningitis. She worked in a textile plant from the age of ten, and later in a cigarette factory. She then married an unsupportive man who drank and gambled and was unstable. The family was forced to rely on state assistance. Landman concluded that there was "absolutely no evidence in the record to indicate that Mary Brewer has a bad inheritance. It might well be concluded from the testimony that society is at fault."
147 By the late 1920s that view had largely moved into the mainstream, led mainly by Progressives. 148 In 1942 the Supreme Court struck down a state statute that mandated sterilization of criminals thrice-convicted of crimes involving moral turpitude.
149 Justice Douglas' opinion for the Court cited numerous scientific sources and repeatedly observed the lack of any evidence of the "inheritability of criminal traits" such as those that the defendant exhibited.
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Racism and Progressive Economics Racism in the Classical Economic Tradition
At least as far back as Adam Smith's Wealth of Nations, racism was a part of AngloAmerican economics. A long line of economists argued that more advanced people are more industrious, while more primitive people are unlikely to accumulate significant capital or develop exchange economies. In making these arguments Smith developed a distinction between "savage" and civilized nations. Savage nations:
are so miserably poor, that, from mere want, they are frequently reduced […] to the necessity sometimes of directly destroying, and sometimes of abandoning their infants, their old people, and those afflicted with lingering diseases, to perish with hunger, or to be devoured by wild beasts. Among civilised and thriving nations, on the contrary […] the produce of the whole labour of the society is so great, that all are often abundantly supplied, and a workman, even of the lowest and poorest order, if he is frugal and industrious, may enjoy a greater share of the necessaries and conveniences of life than it is possible for any savage to acquire. Thomas Malthus spoke even more forcefully on the issue than Smith had. His fullest discussion appears in his famous 1798 "Essay on the Principle of Population," 152 which argued that population growth naturally exceeds growth in the food supply, thus continuously pushing people to subsistence levels. For Malthus, however, an inadequate food supply did not affect all peoples equally. At the bottom were "savages," among whom Malthus counted North American Indians. For example, he observed, slavery was much more common among them, they were continuously at war, and often left their elderly to die. 153 Next above the savages were shepherds, and above them farmers. 154 Even the libertarian John Stuart Mill defended British colonization of India in an essay otherwise advocating non-intervention in the affairs of other countries. For Mill, the conquest of India was a justified example of a civilized nation improving a barbarous one. The main limitation he required is that the occupation be for the purposes of improving the barbarous civilization, not for ransacking it. 155 He argued that negotiating with such nations or establishing norms by treaty would be useless:
arbarians will not reciprocate. They cannot be depended on for observing any rules. Their minds are not capable of so great an effort, nor their will sufficiently under the influence of distant motives.
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American political economists spoke similarly. For example, Brown University's Francis Wayland, one of the better known nineteenth century American political economists and an abolitionist, continuously contrasted "savage" and "civilized" societies, principally in observing that only the latter were able to accumulate significant capital. 157 In particular, Wayland praised Great Britain for attaining superiority over nearly all other nations, notwithstanding lack of "physical advantage." He placed great weight on England's free Constitution, but added that a constitution "is of no value, unless the moral and intellectual character of a people be sufficiently elevated to avail itself of the advantages which it offers." 158 Henry Carey, an economic advisor to Abraham Lincoln, made similar observations in his Principles of Political Economy.
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The Impact of Marginalism Between 1870 and 1930 marginalism completely upended classical political economy. Briefly, classical political economy had drawn its theory of value from the past. For example, the value of a good was thought to be a function of the amount of labor that had been used to make it. By contrast, for marginalists value was based entirely on willingness to pay, a forward looking concept. Further, ideas such as anticipated consumer demand, or marginal value, and marginal cost were capable of being quantified, making marginalism a playground for mathematics. At the same time, however, values estimated from the future are inherently less 152 certain than those computed from the past, and the management of risk and uncertainty became an important feature of the new economics. 160 This was to have profound implications for legal policy, transforming the theory of business finance 161 and eventually making the management of foreseeable risk a central component in private law areas such as torts and even contracts. 162 As a technical matter, marginalist economics never incorporated any particular theory about race or mental inferiority. By the 1930s, when its methodological approach had matured and found nearly universal acceptance, the economic mainstream generally rejected attempts to incorporate assumptions about mental prowess, intelligence, or any other attribute that we might associate with race. Rather, each person was conceived to be a "rational actor" who attempted to maximize his or her own preferences, whatever those might be. Getting behind these preferences in order to evaluate them was not the economist's job. The only requirement was that preferences be "rational," which meant no more than that they must be transitive. For example, if an individual prefers A over B and B over C, then she must prefer A over C. One of the things that was thought to make neoclassical economics scientific was this formalism of assumptions, which avoided the highly eclectic observations of the classical political economists that often included political theory, history and even religion and ethics. 163 During its early development, however, both the usefulness and the domain of marginalism were controversial. Some American economists, such as John Bates Clark, completely embraced it. Others, such as Thorstein Veblen on the left and Simon Newcomb on the right, largely rejected it. 164 Many found compromises that permitted them to merge marginalism with some of the broader concerns about human nature that were characteristic of classical political economy. For example, the short lived movement called Institutionalism included economists who either rejected or qualified marginalism in significant ways, preferring assumptions about human choice that drew from a wider variety of sources, including history and biology. 165 Most of the American economists who were publishing supporters of eugenics were also Institutionalists. As Institutionalism lost its favor in the 1920s, race talk largely disappeared from mainstream neoclassical economics.
Nevertheless, during its early days the founders of what became modern marginalism included observations about race that were quite similar to those made by the earlier classical political economists. For example, in the 1860s William Stanley Jevons, one of the early British founders of marginalism, relied on Darwin for the view that non-Nordic people were ignorant, and that they lacked initiative and foresight, making them unable to accumulate significant capital. 166 In his Theory of Political Economy he wrote that incentives to be productive:
depend greatly upon the character of the race.... A man of lower race, a negro for instance, enjoys possession less, and loathes labour more; his exertions, therefore soon stop. A poor savage would be content to gather the almost gratuitous fruits of nature, if 160 See HOVENKAMP, OPENING OF AMERICAN LAW, supra note 14, at 27-35. 161 Id. at 159-71. 162 Id. at 123-58. 163 Ibid. 164 they were sufficient to give sustenance; it is only physical want which drives him to exertion.
167
Even Alfred Marshall, the highly technical pioneer of marginalist industrial economics at Cambridge University, could not resist an occasional aside about race. In his Principles of Economics (1890) he described "savages" as being ruled by "impulse" and thus lacking the foresight for long range planning, as opposed to "steadfast" Anglo-Saxons. 168 The people of England in particular made up the strongest race and it was they who achieved the modern capital-labor division of the economy. 169 As noted above, many of the America's economic institutionalists rejected neoclassical models in favor of more complex assumptions that took human biology and the theory of evolution into account. 170 For example, Thorstein Veblen preferred to speak of "instincts" rather than preferences, and he expressly incorporated Darwinian survival instincts into his theory of human choice. 171 His writing frequently linked racial diversity to differences in preferences. 172 Later institutionalists such as Edward A. Ross, 173 Richard T. Ely, 174 and John R. Commons 175 did the same thing.
Ross's racial theories have been singled out as a particularly strong example of Progressive racism. 176 However, his theories were actually a complex mixture of hereditary and environmental influences. In his 1901 address to the American Academy of Political and Social Science on "The Causes of Race Superiority" he argued that adaptability to different climates accounted for a great deal of cultural progress, and that the more favorable climates of the northern hemisphere were at least part of the explanation. This premise of adaptability led him to believe that immigration and movement are fundamentally a good thing. "Those branches of a race achieve the most brilliant success which have wandered the farthest from their ancestral home." 177 He also praised democratic forms of government for facilitating progress, as well as the fact that social status "depends little on birth and much on personal success." In sum, while a large amount of what Ross said was racist, he hardly believed that genetic inheritance was the exclusive cause. At the same time, however, Ross believed in eugenics and supported Wisconsin's 1913 compulsory sterilization law. 178 In fact, it was his views on eugenics that resulted in the termination of his professorship at Stanford University, in one of the great academic freedom controversies of the early twentieth century. 179 
Racism and Progressive Labor Legislation
In reading the Progressive literature on race it is important to remember that the period did not have our sense of political correctness about the term. For virtually everyone in the nineteenth and early twentieth century, race was a much more objective classification than it is today. That would remain true until scientific racism gave way to cultural relativism and behaviorism, two of Progressivism's most important contributions to social science. What these progressive methodologies developed was the idea that race is not an objective classification at all, but rather an artificial construct used for either convenience or invidious comparison. 180 Further, during the early twentieth century the term "race" was often used in a noncomparative fashion, more similar to "human race" than as a reference to any particular race. 181 A good illustration is then attorney Louis Brandeis defense of minimum wage legislation in an article he wrote for The Survey in 1915. 182 Brandeis had represented workers in Stettler v. O'Hara, in which the Oregon Supreme Court upheld an Oregon minimum wage law that applied to women and children. 183 The case was affirmed three years later by an equally divided Supreme Court. 184 By that time Brandeis was on the Court but recused himself because of his prior representation. Had he participated the vote would certainly have been 5-4 to uphold the minimum wage.
In his article Brandeis defended minimum wage laws for largely the same reasons that he defended maximum hour provisions in Muller v. Oregon.
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Mainly, as the bearers of children women were particularly vulnerable if they did not receive a livable wage. Significantly, no part of Brandeis' defense of minimum wage legislation made any reference to racial exclusion. He did speak of the necessity of a livable age to prevent the "degeneration of the race." 186 But nothing in the context suggests that he is talking about any particular race or comparing the white race against others. He was talking about the damaging effects of substandard wages on the human race.
The same thing is true of Josephine Goldmark's important 1912 Progressive book Fatigue and Efficiency, a study of laborers who were overworked in order to produce greater productive efficiency. 187 Goldmark was Brandeis' sister-in-law and had co-authored the famous "Brandeis Brief" in Muller v. Oregon. Goldmark devoted a subchapter of her book to the topic of "Race Degeneration."
188 Once again, however, she clearly was not drawing any comparisons among Aryans, Europeans, Africans, Asians, or any other ethnic group. Her point was simply that overwork led to high death rates, low birth rates, promiscuity, and other bad outcomes. To the extent she talked about any particular "race" at all it was the "factory population" themselves, or people living in areas where factory employment was highest. Indeed, the vast majority of factory workers were white. Harsh working conditions had produced "A race of pale, stunted, and emaciated creatures irregular in their lives and dissolute in their habits." 189 She observed data that in various countries which had a military draft "the proportion of young men rejected for physical unfitness is far higher in industrial communities than in others."
190 She cited similar observations about Italian working women, who exhibited greatly impaired ability to bear children if they were employed in industrial occupations. 191 It is thus important not to overread mentions of "race" in Progressives' discussions of workers protective legislation. Some of them implied notions of Aryan superiority or the comparative inferiority of Africans or Asians, but many did not.
Some historians have argued that support for minimum wages laws and other protective legislation was driven by essentially racist concerns. The thrust of this argument is that minimum wage laws would operate so as to reduce the demand for labor, and that employers would selectively reduce hiring by favoring Aryan groups. When the legislation at issue concerned maximum hours or working conditions, the argument was that white workers needed protection from workers from other races who were willing to work under more adverse conditions.
Most American economists identified with the Progressive movement did argue in favor of workers' protective legislation, particularly maximum hour and minimum wage laws, and regulation of employee safety. Some of these statutes were addressed by the Supreme Court and struck down on grounds of liberty of contract, held to be protected by one of the Constitution's Due Process clauses. 192 The legal history of the conflict between Progressive economics and the Supreme Court prior to the Court Packing controversy in 1937 is in large part a story of these decisions. However, as noted below, only a tiny fraction of this literature, including the judicial decisions, ever suggested racial or ethnic exclusion as a rationale. 187 193 A few of these were upheld, but several were struck down by both state and federal courts, mainly on liberty of contract grounds. Some were upheld as applied to minors, but not to adults, and some applied only to women. Some were never enforced. In any event, the 1923 Supreme Court decision striking down the Washington, D.C., minimum wage statute for women was thought to kill the minimum wage movement in the states. 194 New state initiatives emerged in the 1930s, however. A closely divided Supreme Court initially struck down a state statute just prior to the 1937 Court Packing controversy, 195 but upheld one soon after. 196 The judicial resolution to the Court Packing controversy actually occurred in a set of disputes about state minimum wage laws, not in the first instance about federal New Deal legislation.
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Whether or not the claims linking racism to workers' protective legislation such as minimum wage laws are plausible, they must be placed in perspective. They were certainly not Progressive economists' central argument supporting such legislation and were, at most, a sidebar raised by a very small percentage of the defenders of the minimum wage provisions.
The rationales that Progressive Era economists gave in support of protective legislation, including minimum wage laws, are fairly well understood. Most were enthusiastic participants in the marginalist revolution in economics, which saw value in forward looking conceptions of willingness to pay or anticipated contribution. The result was the death of the wage-fund doctrine, one of the more extreme examples of historicism in classical political economy. The backward looking wages fund, which was a staple of classical political economy through Mill, argued that the rate of wages was limited by a "fund" made up of capital accumulation from a previous time period. This "iron law of wages," as it came to be called, entailed that the fund, divided by the number of workers, placed an absolute limit on individual wages. Attempts to pay more would require the firm to borrow against the future, producing bankruptcy and even greater distress for workers.
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For marginalists the proper rate of wages was seen, not as a function of what was previously paid in, but rather of the worker's anticipated contribution to the value of his employer. In the words of John Bates Clark, the most prominent technical American economist of his generation, this principle led to a "scientific law of wages."
199 After completely dismantling the wage-fund doctrine, Clark explained that in a competitive economy the returns for every "factor," or element of production is driven to its marginal value. Lenders of capital, owners, suppliers, and laborers would all receive the value of their contribution, provided that the markets in question were competitive. 200 A vast amount of Progressive Era economic literature defended and developed this proposition. 201 The competition issue was where the rub came in. Labor markets, particularly for unskilled labor, were thought to be much more competitive than markets for production and capital. As a result, when it came to labor, employers had much greater buying power than workers had selling power. The economic term "monopsony," or buyer-side monopoly, would not enter the economic literature until the early 1930s, when Cambridge economist Joan Robinson introduced it in her book The Economics of Imperfect Competition. Speaking of wages, Robinson showed explicitly what many Progressives had intuited: a monopoly employer, or monopsonist, suppresses the buying price, in this case wages, by suppressing employment. As a result, correcting monopsony would result in both higher wages and higher employment. As she observed, "the rise in wages which reduces exploitation and transfers a part or the whole of the monopsony profit to labour will actually result in an increase of employment." 202 To the extent this problem was corrected, higher wages would produce both greater income for workers and more jobs. To the extent that Progressives understood this, the argument that higher wages would suppress demand and exclude Afro-Americans or foreigners was fallacious. Eliminating monopsony would actually produce higher wages and more jobs.
Many Progressive era economists believed that the market in which capitalists purchased labor was far less competitive than the market in which laborers sold it, particularly if the market in question was for unskilled labor. 203 They saw correctly that American industry was producing ever increasing returns, most of which were not going to labor. For them, the question was who should be getting the benefits of the increase. Progressive's put the question as who should be the "residual claimant" of increased industrial productivity. 204 Traditionalists and some Progressives argued that the increased returns properly belonged to capital because machinery, a product of capital, was responsible for nearly all of an enterprise's increased productivity. 205 But the emergent Progressive argument was that laborers were getting an ever smaller share of industrial growth because capital markets were much less competitive than labor markets. Well organized capitalists had complete control over unorganized labor markets. As a result, "the residual claimant is monopoly," Wharton business college Dean Simon Patten concluded in 1908. 206 Overall, the writing of Progressive economists on the wage question developed these positions:
4. Low wages and harsh conditions were being exacerbated by excessive use of child labor as well as excessively lenient immigration policies.
Historians Bernstein and Leonard looked at roughly two dozen publications written by Progressives linking the mandated minimum wage to effects on employment of immigrants, Afro-Americans, or those deemed unfit.
211 This is a tiny portion of the progressive literature devoted to minimum wage legislation. 212 Further, none of the articles they rely on are fundamental technical neoclassical analysis of the kind that reflected the impact of the marginalist revolution in economics. Rather, they are book reviews, roundtable discussions, or articles that attempted to tie economics to broad political policy.
Further, in the literature that Bernstein and Leonard do cite, some of the statements appear to be taken out of context or interpreted differently than their authors intended. 213 The strongest case for their position is Columbia University economist Henry Seager, who argued the eugenics line that sterilization of the unfit could reduce the supply of marginal workers. 214 He also admitted, however, that this concern "may seem somewhat remote from the minimum wage but such a policy judiciously extended should make easier the task of each on-coming generation...."
215 He then added that child labor provisions should be used, as well as "facilities for industrial and trade training" in the public schools.
216 Bernstein and Leonard also quote a passage in which Seager stated that serious laborers needed protection from the "casual worker and the drifter," 217 but Seager himself made no attempt to identify this phrase with immigrants, eugenically unfit, racial minorities or any other particular group. Further, the thrust of his article was that society needed to provide education and training with a view toward creating a prosperous working class of participatory citizens. In his economics textbook, published the same year, Seager argued that many immigrants may have been deceived into coming to America:
In the cities of the United States competition for employment in the sweating trades is made especially severe by the steady influx of immigrants, many of whom find this 211 215 Id. at 12. 216 Ibid. 217 Id. at 12.
species of work the easiest to take up, and do not learn, until after they have been in the country some time, how much worse they are than American workmen in other trades.
218
Bernstein and Leonard also cite a statement from A.B. Wolfe, another progressive economist, that "If the inefficient entrepreneurs would be eliminated [by minimum wages], so would the ineffective workers."
219 But the statement makes clear that Wolfe was acknowledging the existence of inefficient employers as well as inefficient laborers, and his belief that a minimum wage law would weed out both. Significantly, Wolfe never mentioned breeding, eugenics, or race; but simply observed that some employers and laborers were less effective than others. His central argument was that capital markets are noncompetitive, that stock prices were greatly inflated and that stockholders demanded a return in proportion to this inflated value, and that interest rates were too high. 220 All of these phenomena suggested to Wolfe that wages could in fact be raised without damaging productivity, simply by squeezing some monopoly out of the supply side. In redistributing from producers to labor there was much more surplus available on the supply side than the demand side. Wolfe then added:
Turning now to labor supply, the idea that standard minimum wages would stimulate further overgrowth of population is not well founded. One way to reduce the birth rate is to raise the standard of living, and the only way to do that is to raise wages.
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For that, he advocated giving women greater economic independence so that they would "not be tempted to marry simply to escape long hours of hard work at low pay...." 222 Significantly, Wolfe said nothing having to do with eugenics or racism. He mainly observed that, just as not all firms are equally efficient, so too not all laborers are, and a mandatory minimum wage would put pressure on both. Although he cited immigration restrictions as a possible way of keeping the workforce down, he did not suggest excluding particular people based on race or nationality --his suggestion appears to apply equally to northern and central Europeans as to others. 223 To be sure, race-based or ethnic restrictions did come, but these were at the behest of the anti-progressive administrations of Harding and Coolidge. 224 Bernstein and Leonard also discuss a book review by Royal Meeker, a Princeton economist who later worked in the Wilson administration. They quote him as saying that: 223 See also Henry P. Fairchild, The Restriction of Immigration, 2 AM. ECON. REV. 53 (1912) (advocating restrictions immigration based on numbers and worker qualifications, but not race); Walter Lippman, The Campaign Against Sweating, 2 NEW REPUBLIC 1 (March 27, 1915) (advocating immigration restrictions in order to reduce the labor supply, but not suggesting that they be based on race but rather applied to all, including Europeans: "If the European is compelled to work at not less than an American standard he will be less useful to the employers of cheap labor, and less effort will be made to bring him over"; then applying the "same reasoning … to the employment of children"). 224 See discussion infra, text at notes 270-272. July, 2017, Page 33
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It is better to enact a minimum-wage law, even if it deprives these unfortunates of work. Better that the state should support the inefficient wholly and prevent the multiplication of the breed than subsidize incompetence and unthrift, enabling them to bring forth after their kind. 225 However, it is clear from the context that Meeker is reacting to the reviewed author's proposal that the state pay a supplement sufficient to get the wages of substandard workers up to an acceptable subsistence level.
226 By contrast, Meeker himself advocated for worker training, speaking of the "duty of the state to provide manual and technical training to those born under its sovereignty, to the end that the inefficient may be diminished or eliminated." 227 In other words, Meeker was not speaking about a problem of heredity or race, but rather of lack of training that could be remedied if the State would provide it. Indeed, he rejected the author's view that "the poor are poor through their own laziness, inability or thriftlessness."
228 This was not an essay about heredity at all, but rather about lack of job skills.
The authors also briefly mention a 1913 article by Paul Underwood Kellogg, a civil libertarian who worked as a journalist, social reformer and was a founding member of the ACLU. Kellogg discussed the relationship between immigration policy and the minimum wage law. 229 He saw the fundamental problem as an excessive labor supply and believed that limitations on child labor and the labor of women was a partial corrective. But he also believed that there should be immigration restrictions, focused on immigrants destined for industrial occupations. 230 Under his proposal a minimum wage would apply to corporate employers and would limit the minimum wage of immigrants for a period of five years when they could become naturalized citizens. The wage would be determined as "a subsistence basis for American family livelihood." 231 The proposal would not apply to non-corporate employers, including agriculture. With this restriction in place, he argued, the wages of existing unskilled labor would "creep up toward the federal minimum." Significantly, Kellogg made no mention of any racial or ethnic restrictions, but appears to be speaking about immigration generally. Further, the proposal was not aimed at exclusion of immigrants but rather at raising the general level of industrial wages.
Clearly Progressive legislation could be exclusionary, sometimes on racist grounds or based on assumptions about mental unfitness. But there is little support for the proposition that racial exclusion was a central part of Progressives' motivation in enacting minimum wage or maximum hour laws.
Workers' protective legislation, just as all legislation, benefits some people and harms others. Sometimes one can generalize by dividing affected groups into categories, such as competitive or vertically related. Sometimes differential effects are caused by different cost structures, technologies, or education. Nevertheless, it is naïve to point to a policy as deficient 225 simply because it has particular effects on one certain group. For example, one does not "rehabilitate" Lochner simply by showing that unionized bakers approved of the ten hour law because it raised the costs of more marginal bakers. 232 The law was also heavily supported by groups concerned about working conditions. Virtually every government action benefits some groups while harming others. Assessing welfare requires a mechanism for netting out these gains and losses.
Racism and the Active State
The Progressives believed in a more active state then their more laissez faire predecessors and contemporaries. Most Progressive Era regulation was economic, resulting from changes in population demographics and economic theory that led them to place less faith in private markets. Nevertheless, one possibility that cannot be ignored is that even if Progressives were not more racist than laissez faire alternatives, their policy might have been more exclusionary or discriminatory simply because Progressives produced more legislation. The common law largely tolerated most forms of private racism but rarely compelled it. By contrast, de jure segregation, compulsory sterilization, and racist immigration restrictions were all legislative products.
One is hard pressed to show, however, that the era's legislation that discriminated on the basis of race or that compelled sterilization or exclusion of immigrants was particularly attributable to Progressives. During Reconstruction and the Gilded Age the most prominent privately initiated racial social practice in the South was not segregation at all, but absolute exclusion. That is, Afro-Americans were not accorded "separate but equal" facilities but rather no facilities at all. 233 At the end of Reconstruction southern states and municipalities began passing a wide variety of "Jim Crow" laws providing for segregated public facilities. 234 This process accelerated after the Supreme Court struck down the 1875 Civil Rights Act in 1883. 235 All of this happened well before the rise of Progressivism. The Record in the Civil Rights Cases and other litigation makes clear that both exclusionary and segregationist practices were already widespread at that time, even among common carriers and inns, two entities that traditionally had universal service obligations. 236 In 1888 the state of Mississippi passed a statute mandating racially segregated trains, and Louisiana passed a virtually identical statute in 1890. 237 Both statutes produced challenges that went to the Supreme Court, which upheld the first statute against a Commerce Clause challenge in 1890, 238 and the second statute against an Equal Protection challenge in Plessy v. Ferguson in 1896. 239 Segregated public schools appeared in all parts of the country soon after the Civil War. In the South, statutory segregation replaced a system in which enslaved children were generally forbidden from going to school at all. 240 This also occurred long before the rise of the Progressive movement, and its legacy in the South persisted well beyond the Progressive Era and to the mid-twentieth century. Indeed, the earliest cases upholding statutory school segregation date to the 1870s and 1880s.
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Progressive Era decisions approving segregated colleges and residential zoning need to be read in this light. For example, no case can be made that 1904 Kentucky legislation compelling segregated colleges was either a novelty or a Progressive initiative. Although a slave state, Kentucky chose to remain with the Union in the Civil War, largely because it would have been first in line for invasion. 242 In 1874 it passed a statute providing for segregated elementary and secondary schools, replacing a policy of completely denying education to black students. 243 The later statute extending segregation to colleges had been proposed by state representative Carl Day, a vehement segregationist, who was outraged when Progressive President Theodore Roosevelt invited Booker T. Washington to dine with him in the white house. 244 At that time Berea was Kentucky's only integrated college. The Supreme Court upheld the Kentucky statute in 1908. 245 Justices Harlan and Day were the only dissenters. In Lochner three years earlier, both had also dissented from the decision striking down the maximum hours statute. By contrast, all of the Justices left over from the Lochner majority striking down that statute voted to uphold the segregation statute. 246 The same thing is true of the segregationist zoning statutes leading up to the Supreme Court's Buchanan v. Warley decision in 1917, which struck them down for interfering with liberty of contract. Some supporters of segregation by zoning were acknowledged Progressives, while others were not. All of the statutes were passed in what had been slave states prior to the Civil War, although three of them (Kentucky, 247 Maryland, 248 and Missouri) were border states that chose to remain in the Union. More than anything else the legislation reflected Jim Crow racial policies that long antedated the Progressive Movement. Other states passing the statutes included Georgia, 249 North Carolina, 250 South Carolina, Oklahoma, Louisiana, and Virginia. 251 These were not the nation's first segregationist zoning restrictions. Twenty years earlier the federal courts had considered and struck down legislation that excluded Chinese from certain residential areas. 252 The one significant Progressive presence in the Buchanan litigation was the NAACP. 253 The agenda it pursued aggressively from then through the 1950s was to abolish racial segregation. Its activities were paralleled by the National Urban League, another Progressive organization whose main purpose was to broaden economic opportunity for Afro-Americans, particularly those who had migrated north. Like the NAACP, the Urban League also developed a litigation agenda. For example, it was a major force behind the move to litigate against racially restrictive private covenants. 254 Exactly how much of the political force supporting the racial zoning laws was a species of "Progressive reform" and how much was a simple application of Jim Crow? Long before the rise of Progressivism, every state that had passed a segregationist zoning law had also practiced de jure segregation of public facilities and operated segregated schools. 255 Northern cities also experienced huge influxes of Afro-Americans, much of it just as the zoning statutes were being passed. Indeed, the great migration of Afro-Americans, which began early in the twentieth century, saw tens of thousands of Afro-Americans leaving southern cities for homes in the North. 256 Nevertheless, none of these states or their municipalities ever passed a racial segregation zoning provision.
In defending their segregationist zoning ordinance to the Supreme Court, the City of Louisville, Kentucky, relied heavily on racial science. The Louisville Brief on Reargument, which was modelled after the Brandeis Brief in Muller v. Oregon, contained about a half dozen pages of legal argument and one hundred pages summarizing scientific evidence supporting the case against racial integration.
257 Mainstream science had already rejected much of the evidence that the brief cited. 258 It included a discussion of Benjamin A. Gould's study of autopsy reports of Civil War soldiers indicating that "mulatto," or mixed race soldiers were chronically unhealthy. 259 A principal concern of the brief was with interracial marriage, which was the subject of many of the studies it cited. 260 Opposition to interracial marriage was neither novel nor Progressive. Many of the colonies had forbidden interracial marriage, beginning with a Maryland statute passed in 1661 that prohibited white women from marrying slaves. 261 Subsequent to the Revolution many states, both slave and free, passed anti-miscegenation statutes as early as the 1820s. 262 During the regional strife preceding the Civil War some northern states repealed their statutes. 263 In sum, state anti-miscegenation statutes were hardly a progressive initiative, although contemporary racial science certainly served to strengthen long held prejudices.
One set of practices that did develop during the Progressive Era was widespread, mandatory sterilization of certain criminals and, more significantly, people who were deemed "defective" but had never been convicted of a crime. As noted previously, these statutes and procedures were a product of Gilded Age racial science and eugenics. It is equally clear, however, that support for them was widespread and hardly limited to Progressives. For example, excludes those to whom the opportunities of elementary education have been denied, without regard to their character, their purposes, or their natural capacity.
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In sharp contrast, both Presidents Harding and later Coolidge favored stronger and explicitly race based restrictions. The Immigration Act of 1921, also known as the Emergency Quota Act, was passed early in Harding's term. The Act employed a quota system that strongly favored western European immigrants over those from eastern and southern Europe or nonEuropean countries. 273 275 That statute made the quotas in the 1921 Act permanent and also limited the annual number of immigrants from any country to 2% of the number who were already living in the United States in 1890, thirty-five years prior to the statute's passage. The choice of 1890 as a base year might seem peculiar, but its purpose was undoubtedly that the quotas not reflect the large numbers of southern European immigrants that came in after 1890. The quota system strongly favored immigration from northern Europe and the UK, because that was where most people had immigrated from prior to that time. The statute also forbad immigration by any person who was otherwise barred from pursuing citizenship by virtue of race or nationality. At the time, existing law prohibited most Asians, including Chinese and Japanese, from obtaining citizenship. As a result, under the 1924 Act they were not permitted to immigrate either.
To summarize, while Progressivism's idea of a more active state might have become an aggressive tool for expressing racist ideology, the actual legislative record does not indicate that legislation promoting racial exclusion or sterilization of the unfit was uniquely or even substantially Progressive in its origins. Most of the sources were elsewhere.
Progressives and the Nature/Nurture Controversy
When thinking about the Progressives, or any other movement for that matter, it is critical to distinguish the ideas they inherited from those they developed for themselves. although there were some important exceptions. 276 Before long, however, Progressives began to develop less historicist and more environmentalist conceptions of human nature. 277 To be sure, neither they nor anyone else ever came close to eradicating racism from American society. Nevertheless, through a gradual process the social science of the 1910s and after undermined the scientific basis for genetically exclusive, natural science driven views about human intelligence and capacity. These views were distinctly Progressive, in that they were not simply borrowed from the scientific theories of the Gilded Age and earlier. They began to have an important impact on the public law of race relations in the 1940s.
Just as marginalism in economics, environmentalist theories in the social sciences carried few preconceptions about the quality or origins of behavior other than that it be valuable to the person making the choice. 278 Both economic marginalism and environmentalist social science reflected a strong opposition to historicism, or the idea that who we are is completely controlled by our pasts. 279 By contrast, Gilded Age racial determinism was strongly historicist, built on the proposition that the past controls our character and destiny, and that pasts are unchangeable. To a significant extent that was also true of classical political economy, which saw value as a function of past decisions.
The high point of historicism in American public law was the Supreme Court's decision in Plessy v. Ferguson. In upholding the separate-but-equal segregation statute for passenger railroads, the Court observed that the Constitutional argument against the statute "assumes that social prejudices may be overcome by legislation, and that equal rights cannot be secured … except by an enforced commingling of the two races." 280 This argument, which would be played out repeatedly in the segregationist writings of the South, was that racial social relations were the product of long developed custom and could never be changed in the twinkling of an eye by legislation. 281 economic change because it "casts overboard the wisdom of experience," substituting "the winds of mere speculative abstractions." By contrast, the common law develops out of "the nature of the people themselves" as an "outgrowth of their habits of thought and action." 284 The historicist position reflected the principal noneconomic objection to the Progressive agenda favoring increased regulation and worker protection statutes: namely, that nearly all of it was accomplished by legislation. Because of its instantaneous and broadly revisionist nature, legislation was capable of dismissing years of social and judicial experience with one pen stroke. To be sure, the Plessy separate-but-equal statute was legislation, but Justice Brown's opinion for the Court saw it as something far different than the legislation contemplated by Progressives. For Justice Brown, Jim Crow statutes were nothing more than a reflection of long held southern values. They were designed to preserve the status quo, not to change it.
As far as the nature/nurture controversy was concerned, that Progressives would choose nurture was methodologically inevitable. Their forward looking theory of value precluded any other choice. In his History of Economic Analysis Joseph Schumpter conceded as much, but he nevertheless castigated marginalism for finding arguments from nature and heredity to be unimportant. 285 As he put it, marginalist "economists, who are or should be vitally interested in the range of variation of individual 'abilities' and in the question of their inheritance, are but mildly interested in the specifically racialist aspect of the latter." 286 Schumpeter himself had relatively little to say about the subject of genetics or eugenics, although he was sympathetic with some parts of the eugenics agenda. For example, in 1941 he suggested that the urge to procreate produced a bias against people of higher intelligence. "The men and women who want to do something in this life don't want children in the next room. They will be the ones to restrict families first." 287 In addition to marginalist economics, two of Progressivism's most important intellectual contributions were cultural relativism and behaviorism. The former developed mainly within anthropology and the latter in psychology. Both spread to other disciplines and, at least in the case of cultural relativism, more broadly to ethics and religion. Using cultural relativism as a foil, conservatives branded progressivism in the 1930s and after as an ideology without values. 288 For example, for Protestant liberalism -the strongest expression of cultural relativism in religion --all beliefs and values were culturally derived and equally legitimate, provided that they did not harm others. 289 That is, progressive Christianity came to embrace inclusion to the extreme. 290 
Cultural Relativism
The person most identified with cultural relativism in anthropology was German born Franz Boas, whose The Mind of Primitive Man was published in 1911, a dozen years after he became a professor of anthropology at Columbia University. 291 By that time Boas had been studying human culture for more than twenty years, after an early career in geography and physics, and ten years as a museum curator at the Smithsonian. He was in his early fifties when Primitive Man was published. 292 Each chapter of Boas' book dismantled a particular aspect of scientific racism. His opening chapter entitled "Racial Prejudices" completely undermined the notion of earlier evolutionary anthropologists that evolution had been a more-or-less linear progression with Aryan northern Europeans at the culmination. Even a minimal knowledge of history revealed that the world had experienced many periods in which non-Aryan groups such as the Chinese had developed advanced civilizations and culture. In fact, "Several races have developed a civilization of a type similar to the one from which our own had its origins."
293 He also attacked the view that a correlation exists between intelligence and brain weight, 294 and argued that there was no observable correlation between race and intelligence. 295 In a second chapter, entitled "Influence of Environment Upon Human Types," Boas argued that environmental factors dominated inheritance in determining human typology. He believed that one of the biggest factors in determining which tribes or cultures were "primitive" and which were more advanced was the degree of interaction with other tribes or cultures. 296 Further, "retarding" influences in the environment inevitably affected the extent of total human development. For example, a child who is afflicted with disease or other adverse circumstances at an early age might develop out of these conditions, but its total development would generally be less than the development of a child raised in healthier circumstances. 297 "Illness in early childhood, malnutrition, lack of fresh air and physical exercise, are so many retarding causes, which bring it about that the growing individual of a certain age is in its physiological development younger than the healthy, well-nourished individual…." 298 Boas could not find "any example in which the influence of [natural] selection has been proved beyond cavil." However, he was "able to demonstrate the existence of a direct influence of environment upon the bodily form of man…" 299 Apropos of this, he was able to show significant differences in bodily type between first and second generation immigrants to the 291 294 Id. at 18-29. 295 Id. at 120-25. 296 Id. at 43. 297 Id. at 48-49. 298 Ibid. 299 Id. at 52-53.
United States and the peoples from which they had come. 300 The longer the time period since immigration, the more noticeable these differences. 301 He concluded:
We are thus led to the conclusion that environment has an important effect upon the anatomical structure and physiological functions of man; and that for this reason differences of type and action between primitive and civilized groups of the same race must be expected. 302 It seems plausible that one of the most potent causes of these modifications must be looked for in the progressive domestication of man incident to the advance of civilization. 303 Boas did not deny the influence of heredity. Indeed, he devoted an entire chapter to discussing its importance for human typology. 304 But the important things were first, that individual variations within a race were much more substantial than the differences between races. 305 Many characteristics identified as "racial" are nothing more than an expression of the varieties of individuals.
306 Second, the important differences result from a mixture of environmental and hereditary forces interacting with one another.
Boas blamed the then prevalent idea of Aryan superiority on "the growth of modern nationalism, with its exaggerated self-admiration of the Teutonic race." However, "these views are not supported by the results of unbiased research." 307 He then devoted an entire chapter to dismantling the argument of earlier post-Darwinian anthropologists that the various races were going through "stages" of evolution, with Aryans at the most advanced stage.
In 1916 Boas published a withering attack on eugenics in the popular magazine Scientific Monthly. He noted that eugenics simply assumed that characteristics were inherited without making any serious attempt to distinguish genetic from environmental influences.
308 "If an individual possess a desirable quality the development of which is wholly due to environmental causes, and that will not be repeated in the descendants, its selection will have no influence upon 300 Id. at 54-55 (giving examples). 301 Id. at 55. 302 For example, he observed later:
It has also been claimed that lack of control is exhibited by primitive man in his outbursts of passion occasioned by slight provocations. I think that in this case also the difference in attitude of civilized man and of primitive man disappears if we give due weight to the social conditions in which the individual lives. Id. at 108. 303 Id. at 75. 304 Id. 76-99. 305 Id. at 94. 306 For example, on Afro-Americans Boas concluded:
When we turn our attention to the negro problem as it presents itself in the United States, we must remember our previous considerations, in which we found that no proof of an inferiority of the negro type could be given, except that it seemed possible that perhaps the race would not produce quite so many men of highest genius as other races, while there was nothing at all that could be interpreted as suggesting any material difference in the mental capacity of the bulk of the negro population as compared to the bulk of the white population. Id. at 368. 307 Id. at 174. 308 Franz Boas, Eugenics, 3 SCIENTIFIC MONTHLY 471 (1916). the following generations." 309 As a result, it is "of fundamental importance to know what is hereditary and what not." Looking at the various studies of "defective families" such as the Jukes, he concluded that in every case more "favorable home surroundings" and "possession of adequate means of support against the abuse of alcohol" would certainly have changed the result. 310 In fact, "we know that in the great mass of a healthy population the social stimulus is infinitely more potent than the biological mechanism." 311 Boas was willing to live with the much less mathematically manageable world that environmentalist anthropology envisioned. As noted before, the eugenicists' commitment to mathematics was driven mainly by a quest for scientific certainty. But the mathematics of genetic prediction applied only if there was no environmentalist "noise" affecting the results. As a result, eugenicists were forced to exclude environmental influences as inconsistent with the model. Allow them in, and everything becomes indeterminate. Boas additionally objected, however, that even if heredity explained everything the problem of indeterminacy would not go away. In particular, he contrasted humans and lower organisms:
If it is a question of breeding Indian corn or chickens, we know what we want. We desire a large yield of good corn, or many eggs of heavy weight. But what do we want in man? Is it physical excellence, mental ability, creative power, or artistic genius? We must select certain ideals that we want to raise. Considering then the fundamental differences in ideals of distinct types of civilization, have we a right to give our modern ideals the stamp of finality, and suppress what does not fit into our life? 312 on racial exclusion and immigration. 346 While the AFL was exclusionary, the CIO became more acceptant of Afro-Americans and also refused to support aggressive campaigns to restrict immigration. 347 The two groups split over these issues in 1935, finally reuniting in 1955 after the AFL formally abandoned its policies of racial exclusion. 348 
Conclusion
The American Progressives produced an outpouring of writing in economics and the social sciences, including law. This makes it easy for someone to pick and choose through the Progressive record and make a case for practically any proposition.
This fact places a premium on perspective and balance. Yes, many Progressives were racists, but how much did they inherit from their predecessors and what exactly did they contribute themselves? And what about contemporary non-Progressives, of which there were many? Progressives were no more racist than their non-Progressive contemporaries, and the dissenters from genetic natural science models were mainly Progressives. Speaking more generally, the historicist methodologies and perspectives that the early Progressives inherited were highly racist. By contrast, the later methodologies and perspectives that they developed internally -namely, marginalism in economics, and cultural relativism and behaviorism in the social sciences --were environmentalist almost to the point of rejecting genetic influences except for trivial things such as physical appearance.
To be sure, the Progressive conception of an active, legislative state imposed dangers because it could make mandatory or regulatory what had previously been a purely private choice. Nevertheless, no good empirical case can be made that racist legislation or legislation promoting sterilization of perceived mental defectives were distinctive products of Progressivism. Most of it came from a complex mixture of historical sources antedating the Civil War, found support among non-Progressives who opposed the active state in other areas, and in some cases was promoted by anti-Progressives over the objections of Progressives.
The one place that Progressives made a unique and durable contribution to American policy about race and mental defect was in its pursuit of a way out-a process that remains unfinished to this day.
